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Corruption




Corruption is rampant in many poor countries. As such, anti-corruption policies
continue to be a central component of development strategies. For example,
since 1996, the World Bank alone has supported more than 600 anti-corruption
programs.
Unfortunately, this is one area where research has lagged policy. Research on
corruption faces two important obstacles—one empirical and one theoretical.
On the empirical side, the primary challenge is measurement. Corruption, by
its very nature, is illicit and secretive. How does one study something that is
defined in part by the fact that individuals go to great lengths to hide it? How
does one deal with the fact that attempts to measure corruption may cause
the actors involved to either reduce their illicit behaviors during the periods of
measurement or find new ways to obscure their behavior? If we cannot accu-
rately measure corruption, how can we test among diﬀerent theories, measure
its impacts, or even produce suggestive correlations?
In recent years, some progress has been made to deal with these challenges. In
particular, while the previous generation of corruption measures were mainly
1
based on the perception of corruption by participants (with various assorted
problems in interpreting these measures), the current generation of studies have
focused on collecting and reporting objective information, obtained either from
direct measurement or from other information.
The theoretical challenge comes in part from the need to go beyond thinking
of corruption as a generic form of moral hazard in organizations to the point
where we can map diﬀerent manifestations of corruption to diﬀerent underlying
environments, here the word "environment" is interpreted to cover both the
usual focus of the corruption literature – the nature of the monitoring and the
punishments as well as the intrinsic motivation of the bureaucrats (e.g. how
corruption fits into their moral compass) – and, what is less emphasized, the
nature of the particular economic decision that the bureaucrats are participating
in. This expansion is important for two reasons: First, from the point of view of
empirical research, diﬀerences in the nature of corruption in diﬀerent economic
settings is an important source of testable predictions. Second, for policy design,
it is vital that we are able to think of how changing the environment might be
an eﬀective substitute for simply adjusting the punishment (which may not be
feasible).
An example might clarify the second point. Bandiera et al. (2009) study waste
in government procurement in Italy, a country that is often rated as one of the
most corrupt in Europe. Using detailed data, they show that diﬀerent branches
of government pay very diﬀerent prices for the exact same product (down to the
brand and color). These price discrepancies can diﬀer by 50% or more. In fact,
they estimate that the government could save up to 2% of GDP if most purchase
oﬃcers paid the same price as that obtained by the most frugal oﬃcers.
They also show, however, that the price diﬀerences are a function of where the
purchase oﬃcers buy. They can either obtain their supplies from the market
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or from an approved supplier, Consip. Consip charges a publicly announced
price, which leaves no scope for kickbacks. Going to the market, in contrast,
potentially allows the buyer to negotiate his own deal, which might include
something extra for himself. If buyers go to the market to get kickbacks, we
would expect the least corrupt oﬃcers, i.e. those who were previously paying the
lowest prices, to be the ones who switch to the Consip option when it becomes
available. In fact, the data suggest the opposite. When a new item is added
to Consip’s list of available items, the bureaucrats paying the highest prices
turn to Consip. Moreover, these purchasing oﬃcers are also the ones that were,
by all accounts, the best monitored – members of the centralized bureaucracies
rather than the more autonomous hospitals and universities. These observations
suggest a diﬀerent narrative. These oﬃcers pay much higher prices than others
not only because of kickbacks. The issue is also one of justifiability. Buying
from the oﬃcial supplier requires no justification—and no eﬀort. Bandiera et
al. (2009) argue that a major source of the waste here is the fear of being
prosecuted for corruption. Bureaucrats pay high prices to avoid any taint of
corruption. Notice that under this logic, changing the bureaucratic rules to
give the bureaucrat a fixed procurement budget but full discretion – so that she
can even pocket any money she saves, may generate both less waste and less
corruption. She might even pocket more money, but that would be perfectly
legal, and being free to keep the money may give her a strong reason to avoid
waste.
This argument does not imply that full discretion is always a good idea. Think
of the allocation of hospital beds. If need is not related to ability to pay, giving
a bureaucrat full discretion about how to allocate beds may lead to a large pro-
portion of them going to those who do not really need them. Making stringent
rules about how the bureaucrat is supposed to allocate the beds will generate
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corruption, as the greediest bureaucrats will bend the rules to make more money,
but also, potentially, a better allocation, because the more honest bureaucrats
will adhere to the rules.
The more general point is that corruption is the result of the task that the
bureaucrat is assigned to carry out. We can usually get rid of it by setting
the appropriate task (giving discretion), but that is not always desirable from
society’s point of view. The optimal response to the possibility of corruption
may often be to change the nature of the task. Note that the change in the
task may not always reduce corruption: it might just address the misallocation
or degradation of services that corruption often causes (e.g., that hospital beds
were going to the rich or that the wait for a bed was unacceptably long).
Starting from the premise that the corruption we observe may be the result
of the task assigned to the bureaucrat also gives us a way to generate testable
implications. In particular, we will then be able to map the specific problem
the government is trying to solve into a vector of outcomes (e.g., bribes, lines
or misallocation of beds). The questions we seek to answer are of the form: Are
the waits likely to be longer when the government is trying to target hospital
beds to the very poor rather than to the less poor? Are bribes likely to be
greater when trying to target hospital beds to the very poor?
This repositioning of the corruption literature away from a purely crime-and-
punishment approach toward a more task focused approach connects it more
closely to the literature on the internal economics of organizations that has
emerged over the past two decades. This literature explicitly recognizes that
most organizations use bureaucratic mechanisms similar to the ones associated
with government bureaucrats for many of their internal decisions, which creates
scope for corruption (Tirole 1986). However, there is much to be gained from
focusing on the specific characteristics of the kinds of settings in which govern-
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ments often work. For example, one source of corruption in government is that
governments are expected to deliver goods and services to those who cannot pay
for their full value. This issue is less important in for-profit organizations. We
return to the relationship between corruption in government and similar issues
in private firms in Section 3.5.
This chapter highlights the progress made in the corruption literature over the
past decade or so, with a focus on the doors this progress opens for future
research. In this way, it aims to be more forward than backward looking, less of
a comprehensive review of corruption research and more of a guide to where it
appears to be headed.1 It provides a theoretical framework to illustrate the tasks
approach and an overview of the tools that are now available for empirically
analyzing corruption. It then lays out the open questions we think are both
interesting and within reach.
We start with a discussion of what we mean by "corruption" in Section 2. The
key point is that corruption involves breaking rules, not just doing something
that is unethical or against the collective interest. This approach leads us natu-
rally to think of the task that the bureaucrat has been assigned (which includes
the rules). This is the subject of Section 3, where we develop a simple theoretical
framework for thinking about corruption and its many manifestations. We then
discuss strategies for measuring corruption in Section 4. Section 5 discusses a
recent empirical study that provides a clear test of the model, while Section 6
reviews the growing literature on how to combat corruption. We conclude with
a discussion of the main areas we think are important for future research.
1Summarizing a literature as large and multidisciplinary as corruption poses unique chal-
lenges. In this chapter, we have erred on the side of being forward looking, trying to paint a
picture of where this literature is headed. Though we have aimed to cover all important exist-
ing literature, some gaps are an unfortunate necessity to keep an overview within a manageable
length. Our apologies to authors whose work we could not cover in much detail.
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2 Defining Corruption
We define corruption as the breaking of a rule by a bureaucrat (or an elected
oﬃcial) for private gain. This definition includes the most obvious type of
corruption—a bureaucrat taking an overt monetary bribe to bend a rule, thereby
providing a service to someone that he was not supposed to. However, it would
also encompass more nuanced forms of bureaucratic corruption. For example, it
would include nepotism, such as if a bureaucrat provided a government contract
to a firm owned by her nephew rather than to a firm that ought to win a
competitive, open procurement process. This definition would also cover the
case of a bureaucrat who “steals time”: she may, for example, not show up to
work, but still collect her paycheck.2
Under this definition, the rules define what is corrupt. As a result, the same act
can be classified as corruption in one setting but not in another. For example,
in many countries (the United States, India, etc.) a citizen can obtain passport
services more quickly if he pays a fee. While this act would not be considered
corruption in these countries, it would be in others where no such provision in
the law exists. In contrast, many important political economy issues may not
necessarily be considered corruption under this definition. For example, a gov-
ernment oﬃcial providing patronage to supporters may have important ethical
and allocative implications, but this act would not necessarily be corruption if
no formal rule is technically broken.3
The definition of corruption used in this paper is similar to those used by others
in the literature, but there are important distinctions. For example, our defini-
tion is quite similar to that discussed by Svensson (2005: p. 20)—“the misuse
2Quite often, we see the same forms of corruption in the nonprofit sector, where a social
good is being provided, and the private and social value may not necessarily coincide. The
models presented in this paper would naturally extend to the nonprofit sector.
3To see a deeper discussion of political corruption, see Pande (2007).
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of public oﬃce for private gain”— and to Shleifer and Vishny (1993), who de-
fine corruption “as the sale by government oﬃcials of government property for
personal gain.” All three definitions imply that the oﬃcial gains personally from
her particular position. Moreover, as Shleifer and Vishny (1993) define property
quite loosely to include both physical assets (e.g., land) and assets that have
an option value (e.g., a business license), their definition encompasses many of
the same acts of corruption discussed in this paper and in Svensson (2005).
However, there are slight diﬀerences in what qualifies as corruption across the
definitions. For example, suppose we assume that a government oﬃcial has the
final say over whom to allocate a government contract to. He may choose to sell
it to his nephew, and gain great personal happiness from doing so. Thus, this
may be considered corruption under Svensson (2005) and Shleifer and Vishny
(1993). However, if the oﬃcial has the final say, and has not broken any oﬃ-
cial rules, this would not be considered corruption under our definition, despite
being morally questionable.
We have chosen to use this definition for a combination of pragmatic and concep-
tual reasons. Pragmatically, the emphasis on breaking formal rules (as opposed
to moral or ethical ones) sidesteps the need to make subjective ethical judgments
and thereby avoids the need to have a deeper discussion of cultural diﬀerences.4
The emphasis on all kinds of gain rather than just monetary, sidesteps a mea-
surement problem: bribes by their very nature are hard to measure, whereas
rule breaking is easier to measure. Conceptually, these distinctions are also in
line with the framework we describe in the next section.
4Of course, culture is discussed when explaining corruption, simply not when defining it.
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3 A Formal Framework for Understanding Cor-
ruption
The challenge of modeling corruption comes from the very definition of cor-
ruption. As stated in Section 2, corruption is when the bureaucrat (or elected
oﬃcial) breaks a rule for private gain. This immediately raises some questions,
because the rules themselves are chosen by the government. Specifically, why
have these rules, which we know are going to be violated been put in place?
Why not change the rules so that there is no incentive to violate them? This
idea leads to an ancillary question: can you change the rules costlessly and
eliminate corruption without aﬀecting anything else that you care about?
To understand these issues, we begin by thinking about the underlying task.
Our model of tasks is simple, and yet it captures many of the tasks bureaucrats
(and also those in the private sector) typically carry out. We focus on an
assignment problem. A bureaucrat must assign a limited number of slots to
applicants. The applicants diﬀer in their social valuation of a slot, their private
valuation of it, and also their capacity to pay for it. This simple setup captures
many important cases. Consider a profit-maximizing firm selling a good. In
this case, the slot is the good, and private and social values coincide perfectly.
Next, consider the case of a credit oﬃcer assigning loans at a government bank.
Here, the private ability to pay may be the lowest precisely among those who
have the highest social returns from the loan. This potential for divergence
between private and social returns is not incidental—it may be the reason the
government was involved in providing the loans in the first place. However, it
is also the reason there is corruption.
The bureaucrat’s task here goes beyond just allocating the slots: she may also
face rules about what prices she can charge for them and whether she can engage
8
in “testing” to determine an agent’s type. The government sets both these rules
and the incentives facing the bureaucrat.
Although this framework does encompass many models of bureaucratic misbe-
havior in the literature, we make no claims of generality for it. We make a
large number of modeling choices that are pointed out as we develop the model.
These are made mostly in the interests of simplicity and clarity, but many of
them can also have substantive implications.
3.1 Setup
We analyze the problem of a government allocating slots through a bureaucrat
who implements the allocation process. There is a continuum of slots with size
1 that need to be allocated to a population of size N > 1: Agents (i.e., citizens)
have diﬀering private and social values for slots. Specifically, there are two types
of agents: H and L with mass NH and NL, such that NH +NL > 1. The social
value of giving a slot to type H is H and L for type L. We assume that H > L.
Private benefits can be diﬀerent, with each group valuing their slots at h and l.
Agents’ types are private information and unknown by either the government or
the bureaucrat, though the bureaucrat has a technology for learning about type
that is called testing, which we describe below. Agents also diﬀer in their ability
to pay for a slot, which we denote by yh and yl: because of credit constraints
agents may not be able to pay full private value so yh  h and yl  l.
There is a generic testing technology to detect agent types that the bureaucrat
can then use. If used on someone of type L, who is trying to pass the test for a
period of time t; the probability that he will fail the test (i.e., get an outcome
F ) is L(t); 0L(t)  0. The corresponding probability for a type H who wants
to pass is 0; he always passes if he wants to (i.e., gets the outcome S). Either
type can always opt to deliberately fail. The cost of testing for t hours is t
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for the bureaucrat. The cost of being tested for the person for t hours is t: A
simple example of testing would be a driving exam to verify that one can drive.
Testing is the only costly action taken by the bureaucrat in our model. We
assume that the bureaucrat does not put in any eﬀort to give out the slots. We
capture much of what is relevant about bureaucrat shirking through this device,
but there are no doubt some nuances that the model misses.
3.1.1 Possible Mechanisms
The basic problem for the bureaucrat is the choice of a mechanism. The bu-
reaucrat announces a direct mechanism that she can commit to ex ante.5 Each
mechanism constitutes a vector R =(tx pxr; xr); where tx is the amount of
testing for each announced type x = H;L; xr is the probability that someone
acquires a slot conditional on announcing type x = H;L; and getting a result
r = F; S; and pxr is the price this individual will pay in the corresponding con-
dition. We restrict this discussion to winner-pay mechanisms here (mechanisms
where the applicant does not pay when he does not receive a slot). For analysis
of the more general case where a nonrefundable fee to enter the bidding, see,
for example, Banerjee (1997).
Because the bureaucrat only chooses direct mechanisms, any R is supposed to
satisfy the incentive constraints:
HS(h  pHS)  tH  LS(h  pLS)  tL
5We recognize that the actual mechanism used will often be very diﬀerent from the direct
mechanism. We discuss some of the issues this raises in Section 3.6.
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and
LS(l   pLS)(1  L(tL)) + LF (l   pLF )L(tL)  tL 
HS(l   pHS)(1  H(tH)) + HF (l   pHF )H(tH)  tH
Moreover, the clients are allowed to walk away. This is captured by the partic-
ipation constraints:
HS(h  pHS)  tH  0
LS(l   pLS)(1  L(tL)) + LF (l   pLF )L(tL)  tL  0:
There is also a total slot constraint:
NHHS +NLLS(1  L(tL)) +NLLFL(tL)  1
Finally, there is aﬀordability: agents cannot pay more than they have:
pHr  yH ; r = F; P
pLr  yL; r = F; P:
Define R to be the set of values of R that satisfy these conditions.
3.1.2 Rules
The government chooses a set of rules for the bureaucrat that take the form
R =(Tx; Pxr;xr) where Tx is the set of permitted values for amount of testing
(tx), Pxr is the set of permitted prices, and xr is the set of permitted values
for the probability that someone acquires a slot (xr) for x = H;L and r = F; S:
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Although we assume that the government does not observe every individual’s
type, we do allow Pxr and xr to depend on the buyer’s type. The idea is that
if there is a gross misallocation of slots or large-scale bribery by one type, there
may be some way for the government to find out (the press might publish a
story stating that the hospital beds were all being occupied by cosmetic surgery
patients who are paying high prices, or the government might sample a few
people who received the slots). However, we do not assume that being able to
observe violations of Pxr automatically implies being able to observe violations
of xr: it may be easy to find out that some people are being charged more
than the permitted prices without learning anything more generally about how
the slots are being allocated.
We assume that R is feasible in the sense that there exists at least one R =
(tx; pxr; xr) 2 R such that tx 2 Tx; pxr 2 Pxr and xr 2 xr: If R is not a
singleton, then the bureaucrat has discretion.
The government also chooses p, which is the price that the bureaucrat has to
pay to the government for each slot he gives out. Assume that this is strictly
enforced, so that the price is always paid. This assumption can be relaxed easily,
but the result oﬀers no new insights.
In specific examples, we make specific assumptions about what the government
can contract on, which will give structure to R. For example, if tx is not
contractible, then the rules will not say anything about it—in other words,
Txwill be [0;1] [0;1]:
3.1.3 The Bureaucrat’s Choice
For each mechanism R 2 R\R the bureaucrat’s payoﬀ is
NHHS(pHS p)+NLLS(pLS p)(1 L(tL))+NLLF (pLF p)L(tL) NHtH NLtL:
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However, if R is in R\Rc, we assume that a bureaucrat pays a cost for breaking
the rules, which we will refer to as . Hence, the bureaucrat’s payoﬀ for any R
is in R\Rc, is
NHHS(pHS p)+NLLS(pLS p)(1 L(tL))+NLLF (pLF p)L(tL) NHtH NLtL 
(1)
We assume that the cost  is unknown to the government when setting rules,
though it knows that it is drawn from a distribution G(). A corruptible bu-
reaucrat is one for whom  is finite.6 As a result, we write R(R; ) as the
mechanism chosen by a bureaucrat with cost of corruption  when the rule is
R.7
3.1.4 The Government’s Choice
We assume that the bureaucrat is the agent of what we call the “government”
(but what others have called the “constitution-maker”), a principal whose pref-
erence is to maximize the social welfare generated by the allocation of the slots.
This assumption is partly an artifact of the way we model things. What is key
is that the bureaucrat has a boss whose objectives are diﬀerent from hers and
who is in a position to punish her. Otherwise, she would never have to break
any rules because she, in eﬀect, would make her own rules. The assumption
that her boss cares only about social welfare is convenient but not necessary.
Much of what we have to say would go through if the principal cares less about
the bureaucrat’s welfare and more about that of the other beneficiaries, which
may be true even if one thinks of the principal as the standard issue, partly
venal, politician. After all, the politician cares about staying in power, and
making the bureaucrat happy may not be the best way to do so. Of course,
6This formulation is quite specific, and the cost of violating the rules is independent of the
extent of violation.
7We assume that when indiﬀerent, the bureaucrat chooses what the government wants.
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it is possible that the bureaucrat is the one who cares about beneficiaries and
is trying to protect them from her boss. This is an interesting and perhaps
important possibility that we do not investigate here. More generally, a setup
like ours deliberately rules out the more interesting strategic possibilities that
arise in models of political economy, to focus on the implementation issues that
arise even without them.8 The government therefore maximizes

[NHHS(R(R; ))H +NLLS(R(R; ))(1  L(tL(R(R; ))))L
+NLLFL(tL(R(R; )))L  ( + )NHtH(R(R; ))  ( + )NLtL(v)]dG()
by choosing R.
3.1.5 Interpretation
We intend for this model to be the simplest one that can illustrate all features
of interest. Specifically, it allows the bureaucrat to have multiple dimensions of
malfeasance:
 Corruption is when the bureaucrat breaks the rules.
 Bribe-taking is when the bureaucrat charges higher prices than those man-
dated.
 Shirking is when the bureaucrat fails to implement mandated testing.
 Red-tape is when the bureaucrat implements more than the mandated
amount of testing.
8It is also worth making clear that the assumption of welfare maximization, while stan-
dard, is quite particular. The government could care, for example, about the distribution of
welfare between the bureaucrats and the potential beneficiaries. In this case the government
may prefer an ineﬃcient outcome because it achieves distributional outcomes better and may
therefore create a more complex set of trade-oﬀs than are permitted here. We will return to
this issue in the concluding sub-section, 3.6.
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 Allocative ineﬃciency is when the wrong people obtain the slots (according
to the rules) or some slots remain unallocated when the rules require that
all slots be given out.
There is corruption in equilibrium because the government does not observe the
cost . If the government knew the particular bureaucrat’s ; it would know
what the bureaucrat would choose, given the rules that are set; hence it would be
able to set rules that would not be broken. However, when  can take diﬀerent
values, government has to choose between rules that give the bureaucrat a great
deal of discretion (so that they will almost never be broken) and rules that are
more rigid (to induce the bureaucrat to act in the social interest) and therefore
will be broken by some bureaucrats, precisely because they are more stringent.
This straightforward problem goes beyond the standard resource allocation
problem under asymmetric information in two important ways. First, we do
not assume that the private benefit to the person who obtains the slot is neces-
sarily the social benefit. Such a divergence is characteristic of many situations
involving the government. For example, society wants to give licenses to good
drivers (H > 0) and not to bad ones (L < 0); but the private benefits of getting
a license are probably positive for both types. Or suppose the slot is avoiding a
jail sentence. H types are innocent. L types are not. H > 0 is the social benefit
of not sending an innocent to jail. L < 0 is the social benefit of not sending a
criminal to jail. However, the private benefits are positive for both types: h 7 l
but h; l > 0. Second, we allow the potential beneficiaries to have an ability to
pay that is less than their private benefits (or willingness to pay) (l > yL or
h > yH). This condition is conventionally treated as being equivalent to the
beneficiary being credit constrained, but it is worth emphasizing that it covers a
range of situations (including the credit-constraint case). For example, consider
the person who wants to take his child to the hospital to be treated but his per-
15
manent income does not cover the cost. He would, however, be willing to pay
his entire income (less survival needs, say) to save his child’s life and also would
be willing to additionally stand in line for 4 hours a day every morning. In this
case, his total willingness to pay (in money and time) is clearly greater than
his ability to pay. Clearly, if he could freely buy and sell labor, this case would
reduce to the standard credit constraint case, but given the many institutional
features that govern labor markets, this would be an extreme assumption.9
However, the formulation embodies a number of important simplifying assump-
tions. We impose, for example that rule breaking of any type has the same
cost, which obviously need not be the case. For example, when a bureaucrat
and an agent collude in such a way that the agent is better oﬀ than under the
oﬃcial rules, there will probably be less chance of being caught than when the
bureaucrat attempts to make the agent worse oﬀ. We also do not deal with dis-
tributional issues: the government’s preferences are indiﬀerent to who –between
the bureaucrat and his various types of clients– gets to keep how much money.
We return to why this issue may be an important later in the paper.
3.2 A Useful Typology
Before jumping into the analysis of this model, it is helpful to underline some
of the diﬀerent possibilities that can arise in our framework (Table 1). The
following typology will prove to be particularly handy. The labels of the cases
should be self-explanatory, but more explanation emerges as we analyze each
case.10
9Another example that exploits a diﬀerent rigidity in labor markets is the following. There
is a woman who is not allowed by her family to work but she is willing to walk 3 miles every
day to make sure that her child gets an education. Her ability to pay (assume that the rest
of the family does not care about education) is clearly less than her willingness to pay.
10The fact that we have only 4 cases is an artifact of the assumption that all H types are
identical in their willingness and ability to pay and likewise for L types. However, the basic
distinction we are trying to make here is between the case where H types are willing to and/or
able to pay more and the case where they may not be (captured by h  l and yH  yL): The
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Table 1. Possibilities arising from the corruption model
Agent’s Valuation of Slot Agent’s Relative Ability to Pay
yH > yL yH  yL
h > l Case I: Alignment Case III: Inability to pay
h  l Case II: Unwillingness to pay Case IV: Misalignment
3.2.1 Examples of Case I: Bids Aligned with Value
In this case, social and private value rankings align. Although the pure market
case, H = h = yH ; L = l = yL, belongs to this category, this case is ultimately
broader than that because even though the rankings may align, the actual ability
to pay may not match social value. Some other examples that fall into this case
include:
1. Choosing eﬃcient contractors for road construction. Type H are the more
eﬃcient contractors. For the same contract, they make more money (h >
l): Contractors asking for a lower price for their work, is the same thing
as them paying more upfront to secure a contract which will eventually
pay them a fixed amount. Because the contractors will be paid for their
work, the price that they pay to obtain the contract can be seen as just
a discount on how much they will eventually be paid rather than viewed
as an out-of-pocket expense. It is plausible therefore that yH = h and
yL = l:
2. Allocating licenses to import goods to those who will make the socially
optimal use of them. In an otherwise undistorted economy, the private
benefits should be the same as the social benefits, as in the road construc-
tion example, but in this example there may be credit constraints because
situation where a large fraction of L types are willing to and/or able to pay more than a large
fraction of H types is qualitatively very similar to the case where all L types are able/willing
to pay more than all H types.
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the license is first paid for and the profits come later. However, it is plau-
sible that the type H 0s should be able to raise more money than the type
L0s: Thus, yH < h = H > L = l > yL and yL < yH:
3.2.2 Examples of Case II: Unwillingness to Pay
This case is the least likely of the four cases, and so we do not spend much
time on it. However, one possible example is a merit good such as subsidized
condoms for protection against HIV infection: H are high-risk types. They like
taking risks. Hence, h < l: However, they may also be richer than L types (e.g.,
because they can aﬀord to buy sex): yH > yL:
3.2.3 Examples of Case III: Inability to Pay
In this case, there is alignment of values: the high type values the good more
than does the low type, but there is an inability to pay.
1. How to allocate hospital beds? The H types more urgently need the
hospital beds (e.g., compared to those who just want cosmetic surgery).
The social valuation probably should be the private valuation in this case:
H = h > L = l > 0: However, there is no reason to assume that the
H types can aﬀord to pay more. We capture this situation by assuming:
yH = yL = y:
2. How to allocate subsidized food grains targeted to the poor? Presumably,
theH types are the poor who benefit more from subsidized food grains and
the social benefit is plausibly just the private benefit (H = h > L = l > 0).
However, the poor may not be able to pay as much for the grains as the
non-poor: yH < yL:
3. How to allocate government jobs to the best candidates? The private gains
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from obtaining the job may be higher for the H types (because the jobs
oﬀer so much more rents than the next-best alternative, and the better
candidate may get more out of the job). However, everyone is constrained
by how much they can pay for the job upfront (yH = yL = y):
3.2.4 Examples of Case IV: Values Misaligned
In this case, there is simple misalignment between social and private valuation:
those to whom the government would like to give the slot value it the least.
1. Law enforcement. This example we have already mentioned, where the
slot is avoiding jail time: H > 0 > L; yH = yL = y; h = l > 0:
2. Driver’s Licenses. We discussed the setup of this example previously.
However, this example would fall under Case IV if bad drivers value the
license more, because they are more likely to be picked up by the police:
H > 0 > L; yH = yL = y; h < l:
3. Procurement. The government wants to procure a fixed number of widgets
and has a fixed budget for them (e.g., as in Bandiera et al. 2009). Suppose
there are high-quality firms and low-quality firms. It is socially eﬃcient
to procure widgets from the high-quality firm, even though these firms
have higher costs. In this case the slot is the contract, which needs to be
allocated among firms. The gains from getting the contract are obviously
higher for the low-quality firm, which has lower costs. So l > h: As long as
these firms are not credit constrained, that would also mean that yH = h
and yL = l:
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3.3 Analyzing the Model
This very simple model nevertheless allows for a rich variety of possibilities and
situations. Here we confine ourselves to some illustrative examples of the kind
of incentive issues that can arise in this framework, the corresponding patterns
of rules chosen, and the violations of the rules. Specifically, we focus on a set
of special instances of Cases I, III and IV, which yield many of the insights we
are looking for. We then briefly discussion the other cases.
3.3.1 Analysis of Case I
In this case, private and social rankings are aligned. Assume in addition that
NH < 1, but L > 0; so that it is optimal to give the leftover slots to L types.
To solve the government’s problem, we start with the mechanism design prob-
lem. Consider the following candidate solution (we drop the success or failure
subscripts when a particular type is not being tested):
pH = yL + ; pL = yL
H = 1; L =
1 NH
NL
tH = tL = 0
Notice that the low types would not want to pretend to be high types. They
cannot pay pH . What about the high types? If they pretend to be the low
types they could pay  less, but they would receive the slot with a probability
less than 1. As long as




the high types would prefer to pay the price and be guaranteed a slot. We can
always set  low enough to ensure that this is the case. Therefore, the mechanism
is incentive compatible for small enough : Because both types receive positive
expected benefits, the participation constraints are also satisfied. The solution
is feasible because the ratio 1 NHNL was chosen precisely to exhaust the total
number of slots. Finally, it is aﬀordable, as long as  is small enough because
yH > yL in this case. Define E to be set of  such that this mechanism is in R.
This solution is also social welfare maximizing because every H type receives a
slot, every slot is taken up and no one is tested. The key question is whether
the bureaucrat will want to choose this mechanism for some  2 E; if he will
choose it then the government’s problem is solved. However, it is possible that
he might prefer an alternative mechanism.
Given our assumption that there is a fixed cost of breaking the rules, if the
bureaucrat is corruptible and chooses to break the rules, he will choose the
mechanism that maximizes his payoﬀ given by (1). Therefore, he will want to
maximize the amount of revenue he can extract. The mechanism already allows
him to extract all possible revenues from type L: To maximize his payoﬀ (in








Let us, with some abuse of terms, call the following the “auction mechanism”:
pH = p

H ; pL = yL
H = 1; L =
1 NH
NL
tH = tL = 0
However, in this scenario, he is not extracting all the rents from type H 0s,
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because pH might be lower than yH : What are the other mechanisms that could
potentially give him higher payoﬀs?
One is the class of “monopoly mechanisms”. Set
pH = fpH  yH ; pL = yL;







tH = tL = 0
These mechanisms are constructed so that the probability of getting the slot
as an L type is low enough that no H type will want to pretend to be an L
type. No L type can aﬀord the slot at the H type’s price, so that incentive
constraint also does not bind. By construction, these mechanisms also satisfy
the slot constraint, as well as the participation and aﬀordability constraints.
However, they generate an ineﬃcient outcome, as some slots are wasted.




+ yL < fpH  yH : The condition that it makes more money than the
auction mechanism is that the expression
NH(fpH   p) +NL (h  fpH)
(h  yL) (yL   p)
is increasing in fpH ; because for fpH = (h   yL)N 1NL + yL; this is exactly the




If this condition holds, the monopoly mechanism that maximizes the bureau-
crat’s earnings will have fpH = yH : Otherwise, the auction mechanism domi-
nates.
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Finally, the last alternative we consider is the “testing mechanism”:
pH = minfyH ; h  (h  l)1 NH
NL
g; pLS = pLF = yL:
H = 1; LS = LF =
1 NH
NL




  (h  yH); (l   yL)1 NH
NL
gg
The exact construction of this mechanism is less obvious, so let us look at it in a
bit more detail. The idea of this mechanism is to use testing just to reduce the
rents of the self-declared L types, so that H types would not want to pretend
to be L types. It is ineﬃcient because testing is wasteful. Because H types are
more likely to pass a test than L types, it would be counterproductive to reward
“passing": the goal is to discourage H types from pretending to be L types. To
reward failing the test also does not work: H types can always fail on purpose.
Therefore, there is no advantage to condition on test outcomes. To see that
testing relaxes type H 0s incentive constraint, note that now it becomes:
(h  pH)  (h  yL)1 NH
NL
  tL:
Clearly, pH can go up when tL increases, which is why the bureaucrat might
want it to. However, there is obviously no point in driving tL past the point
where pH = yH : This defines one limit on how large tL should be:
(h  yH)  (h  yL)1 NH
NL
 tL
Another limit comes from the fact that, by imposing testing, the L type is made





As long as IRL is not binding, raising tL always pays oﬀ in terms of allowing pH
to be raised. Once it binds, it is possible to continue to increase tL by reducing
pL below yL: However, this will never pay oﬀ, because reducing pL also forces
the bureaucrat to reduce pH : Setting tL = (l yL) 1 NHNL and plugging this into
type H 0s incentive constraint gives us the limit on how high we can drive pH
by testing L types:
pH  h  (h  l)1 NH
NL
:
Putting these observations together explains why we construct the testing mech-
anism in this way.
It is also worth observing that tL = 0 when yL = l: This result occurs because
when IRL is binding, red tape will never be used. Thus, the fact that the
bureaucrat’s clients are unable to pay the full value of what they are getting is
key to the result that there is red tape (that is why they pay in “testing” rather
than money).
These three mechanisms do not exhaust the class of feasible mechanisms. For
example, it may be possible to combine the testing and monopoly mechanisms.
However, it is easy to think of situations where each of them may be chosen by
some bureaucrats, depending on the rules that the government sets and other
parameters. The trade-oﬀs that this model generates are mainly what we need
to understand.
Scenario 1 Suppose that (h  yL)N 1NL + yL  yH : Then, the auction mecha-
nism extracts as much rents as possible. The government can give the bureau-
crat full discretion (no rules) and expect the optimal outcome. It can then set
p to appropriately divide the surplus between itself and the bureaucrat. The
bureaucrat chooses the auction mechanism.
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Scenario 2 Suppose that (h  yL)N 1NL + yL < yH : Assume that xr, pxr, and
tx are contractible. The rules do not impose any restrictions on the choice of
tx: Also, assume that the bureaucrat has no cost of testing ( = 0), and that it
is possible to extract maximal rents from type H by testing the type L, which
will be true when 11
yH  h  (h  l)1 NH
NL
:
Suppose first that the government sets no rules. Because the bureaucrat pays no
cost for testing and testing allows her to extract maximal rents, she will choose
the testing mechanism described above as a way to create artificial scarcity.
One alternative for the government is to set the rules so that the maximum price
the bureaucrat can charge is (h yL)N 1NL +yL, and all testing is forbidden. For
those bureaucrats not prepared to break the rules, the optimal mechanism in
this case will be the auction mechanism (because they were deviating from it
precisely to charge the H type a higher price, which is now not allowed).
However, those bureaucrats who have a low cost of breaking the rules (low )
will deviate from the auction mechanism and choose either the testing or the
monopoly mechanism.12 The testing mechanism tends to extract less money
from each L type (because they also pay the cost of being tested), but more
L types get slots. Which of the two will be chosen depends on the parame-
ter values. For example, an increase in yH   yL, keeping l   yL fixed, makes
the monopoly mechanism relatively more attractive (intuitively, when the H
type can pay relatively more, the cost of including the L type increases). If
the monopoly mechanism is chosen, there will be no red tape, but large bribes
11As long as yL < l; this condition is consistent with the condition (h yL)N 1NL +yL < yH
imposed above.
12It is true that in our model we would get the same result with either a rule on testing or a
cap on the price, but this reflects our extreme assumption that breaking one rule is the same
as breaking them all. An epsilon extra cost of breaking two rules instead of one would make
it strictly optimal to have both rules.
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(price above the maximum allowed price) will occur. If the testing mechanism is
chosen, we will observe both bribery (price above the maximum allowed price)
and red tape. Nevertheless, from the social welfare point of view this outcome
is strictly better than the no-rules outcome because a fraction of the bureau-
crats (those with high ) choose the auction mechanism. What is particularly
interesting here, though, is that the rules themselves are now aﬀected by the po-
tential for corruption. A diﬀerent set of rules make sense when the bureaucrats
are more corruptible.
Scenario 3 Suppose that (h   yL)N 1NL + yL < yH : Assume pxr and tx are
contractible, but xr is not.13 However, let  be very high so that the bureaucrat
is not prepared to use red tape.
In the absence of any rules, the bureaucrat will either choose the auction or
the monopoly mechanism. We already generated the condition under which the




Interestingly, this condition is less likely to hold if p is lower—the government
may be better oﬀ not charging the bureaucrats for the slots. However, even with
p = 0; it is possible that the above condition holds (especially if yL is very low),
and the bureaucrat, unconstrained, would choose the monopoly mechanism.
Suppose that this is the case. Then, the no-rules outcome will leave many slots
unallocated.
The government may prefer to set a rule where the prices that can be charged are
capped by (h yL)N 1NL +yL: Then the bureaucrats who have high  will choose
13In our model, because the bureaucrat always pays the government for the slots, the
government actually knows how many slots he has used and therefore should able to contract
on x: However, it is easy to think of an extension of the model to a state of the world where
the demand for slots is lower and the government does not observe this state.
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the auction mechanism, while the low- bureaucrats will choose the monopoly
mechanism. There will be bribery because the monopoly price is higher than
the price cap.
3.3.2 Analysis of Case III
Let us focus on one special case: L > 0; NH < 1; h > l; yH = yL (which are the
assumptions under which this case is analyzed in Banerjee (1997)). To limit the
number of cases, let yH = yL = y < l and L(t) = 0; that is, no one ever fails
the test. In this case, once again there is an auction mechanism:
pH = y; pL = p

L
H = 1; L =
1 NH
NL
tH = tL = 0
where pL is such that
14
l   y = (1 NH)
NL
(l   pL):
This mechanism implements the eﬃcient outcome because the high types, though
they cannot pay more, value the slot more (h > l) and hence would rather pay
the high price (all they can aﬀord) and ensure a slot rather than risk not getting
one at the low price. The logic of auctions still works.
However, now consider an alternative testing mechanism:
pH = y; pL = y





H ; tL = 0
14This only works if y is high enough. Otherwise pL might have to negative.
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where tH is given by




As in scenario 2, testing only happens when l   y > 0:
Third is a lottery mechanism, given by:
pH = y; pL = y
H = L =
1
N
tH = 0; tL = 0
The bureaucrat charges everyone y and simply holds a lottery to allocate the
slots.
Scenario 4 Suppose that xr, pxr, and tx are all contractible and  = 0:
What would happen if the government set no rules? The bureaucrat would
always prefer the lottery, with a very significant misallocation of slots.
Now, suppose the government sets the rules so that the bureaucrat is required
to choose
H = 1; L =
1 NH
NL
but there is no rule for what prices he can charge or the amount of testing.
Every bureaucrat will choose the testing mechanism because it gives them the
same payoﬀ as the lottery without breaking any rules.
Suppose the government wants to stop this unnecessary testing. Then, it can
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set rules so that the bureaucrat is required to set the auction mechanism:
pH = y; pL = p

L
H = 1; L =
1 NH
NL
tH = tL = 0
This mechanism will be chosen by those bureaucrats who have high enough :
However, the low- bureaucrats will choose the testing mechanism and there
will be both bribery and red tape.15
Alternatively, the government could choose the lottery as the rule. All bureau-
crats would then choose it and there would be no corruption and no red tape,
but the outcome that everyone chooses would involve misallocation. However,
because there is no testing, this outcome might be better than the outcome from
the testing mechanism if the cost of being tested, ; is high enough. Moreover,
the testing mechanism is only better because it makes the high- bureaucrats
choose the optimal mechanism. Therefore, if most bureaucrats face a low value
of ; representing a government that cannot enforce the rules very well, then
the lottery mechanism is likely to dominate.
3.3.3 Analysis of Case IV
Let us restrict our attention to the specific situation NH > 1; yL = l > h = yH ;
and L < 0: The goods are scarce, but the private valuation of the high types
is lower than that of low types. The low types should ideally not obtain the
slots.16 The analysis in this section draws on Guriev (2004). Consider the
15Once again we assume that the bureaucrat (at least weakly) prefers to break one rule
rather than two.





H ; pHF = pL = l
HS = 1=NH ; HF = L = 0
tH = t

H ; tL = 0
where tH and p

H solve the two equations.
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h  tH   pH = 0 (2)
(1  L(tH))(l   pH)  tH = 0: (3)
It is easy to check that this mechanism satisfies all the constraints. Of particular
interest are type L0s truth-telling constraint:
(1  L(tH))(l   pH)  tH  0
that states that type L individuals weakly prefer not getting the slot than pre-
tending to be a type H and getting it with some probability: It is clear that for
this condition to hold, it must be that tH > 0, because without testing the L
types always want the slot if the H types do. Testing is necessary in this case.
This mechanism also implements the optimal allocation (only H types get the
slots) with the least amount of testing.
However, the bureaucrat may consider other mechanisms. One possibility is a
17We assume that solution with pH  0 exists, which is true when l  h is not too large.
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straight auction:
pH = pL = l
H = 0; L = 1=NL
tH = 0; tL = 0
Another is a lottery. No one is tested, but the allocation is all wrong—only L
types receive the slots:
pH = pL = h
H = 1=N; L = 1=N
tH = 0; tL = 0
Scenario 5 Suppose that xr, pxr, and tx are contractible, and  > 0: Con-
sider what would happen without any rules. The auction mechanism maximizes
the bureaucrat’s earnings without any testing and will be chosen. Now suppose
the government sets rules about tx; xr; and pxr exactly at the level given by the
testing+auction mechanism. Bureaucrats who do not want to break the rules
will then choose the testing+auction mechanism: The ones who are prepared
to break the rules will choose the auction mechanism. There is bribe-taking,
shirking, and misallocation of resources (similar to Bandiera et al. 2009).
However, the government could also give up on trying to implement the ideal
testing+auction mechanism. It could set the rules corresponding to the lot-
tery mechanism. The advantage of this mechanism is that the bureaucrats are
making more money from the slots because h > pH and spending less eﬀort on
testing; hence the gains from deviating are smaller. The disadvantage is that
some slots go to the L types even if the bureaucrat is not corrupt. However,
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fewer of them deviate from the rules and give all slots to the L types.
3.4 Interpretation of Results
The above analysis makes clear the essence of our approach. Governments
are interested in setting rules when the laissez-faire outcome does not maximize
social welfare. Put simply: in this model, governments only interfere to improve
an ineﬃcient situation. Corruption, however, results when these rules do not
extract maximum surplus for the bureaucrat. Sometimes the rules allow the
bureaucrats to extract surplus exactly as she wants (e.g. Case I in Section 3.3.1),
but in many other cases it may not. The task assigned to the bureaucrat and
the rules are chosen by a government cognizant of the possibility for corruption.
In several of the cases, it is clear that the presence of corruptible bureaucrats
changes the rules and tasks. The government chooses those rules, and the task
assigned to the bureaucrat, recognizing that the rules will sometimes be broken.
The overall outcome is still improved by setting those rules. This is the essence
of tasks approach.
However, the model also oﬀers other more specific insights. The first observation
is that red tape goes hand in hand with bribery. Given that testing is costly,
there is no reason to overuse it, unless there is extra money to be made.
However, there are two distinct reasons for using it. When the willingness
to pay is aligned with ability to pay and social valuation (Case I, specifically,
Scenario 2), red tape is faced by L types, i.e., those who have a low probability
of obtaining the good, and is designed to create some artificial scarcity and
extract more rents for the bureaucrat (along the lines suggested by Shleifer and
Vishny (1994)). In other words, the purpose of the red tape is to screen in
the high willingness to pay types. When ability to pay is not related to the
willingness to pay (Case 3, Scenario 4) then red tape emerges, because even
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corrupt bureaucrats prefer to generate as eﬃcient an allocation as possible,
conditional on not making less money. The red tape is then placed upon the H
type, and the purpose is to screen out the low willingness to pay types.
The second point is that red tape only emerges when yL < l:Moreover, it is easy
to check that in both cases red tape increases in the gap between the willingness
to pay and the ability to pay. The intuition is simple. It is precisely because
this gap exists, that it is possible to impose red tape. If there were no such
gap, the client would simply walk away if faced with a lot of red tape. This
reasoning makes it clear why people do not have to endure red tape when they
try to buy most marketed goods (i.e., goods for which l = yL). Governments are
associated with red tape, in this view, because governments often supply goods to
people whose ability to pay is less than their willingness to pay. For that reason,
this problem is particularly acute for governments serving the poor.
A third point, which is related to the first, is that red tape does not have to
result from scarcity. Scarcity may have a positive or a negative eﬀect on red tape
depending on whether we are trying to discourage the H type from pretending
to be an L type (Scenario 2, where scarcity reduces red tape) or the opposite
(Scenario 4, where scarcity increases red tape).
A fourth point comes from thinking about the correlation between red tape and
bribery. This correlation is emphasized by LaPorta et al. (1999) who, looking at
cross-country data, argue that the positive correlation of testing with bribery is
evidence that much of testing is unnecessary and is hence red tape. As already
observed, red tape only occurs when there is bribery. However, we cannot
assume that there is always more red tape when there is more bribery—that
depends on what is the underlying source of variation as well as the underlying
economic problem. For example, both in Scenarios 2 and 4, the incentive to move
away from the auction outcome toward the testing outcome is always stronger
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when l   yL is larger. Therefore there will be more red tape and corruption
when yL is lower, as long as the government sets rules that correspond to the
socially eﬃcient mechanism. In contrast, when yH  yL increases keeping l  yL
fixed corrupt bureaucrats will switch from testing to monopoly (see Scenario 2).
There is an increase in the size of bribes and a decline in red tape.18
A fifth point follows from Scenario 5. Bribery can be associated with red-tape,
but it is also associated with shirking, which in a sense, is the opposite of red
tape.
A sixth point follows from the observation in Scenario 4 that a rightward shift
in the distribution of  will lead the government to switch from rules that
correspond to the lottery mechanism to rules that correspond to the testing
mechanism. This switch will lead to greater bribery and more red tape, but
to less misallocation and is therefore worthwhile. In other words, greater state
capacity might be associated with more red tape and bribery. Conversely, a
lack of bribery cannot be interpreted as evidence that all is well.
A seventh observation is that corruption might force the government to give up
on trying to maximize its revenues from the sale of slots. In Scenarios 1 and 3,
we saw that the government should set the price of the slots to the bureaucrat
as low as possible to reduce corruption.
Finally, it is clear that the government often faces a choice between more de-
18A negative correlation would also result if we were prepared to go outside the world of
the model and assume that the government has other unmodeled reasons for setting a price
cap that does not have to do with promoting eﬃciency. For example, the government may
be sensitive to distributional or ideological concerns—government bureaucrats should not be
seen as becoming too rich, even if that is what eﬃciency demands. Or there may be some
political or symbolic argument for making all public goods free or very cheap. This might
lead the government to set the price cap below yL: Take the extreme case where the good is
supposed to be free (the cap is zero). In this case the government would actually want the
bureaucrat to test those who apply for the slots (because the price mechanism will not do any
screening). Here a bureaucrat who is corrupt might actually do some good: all he needs to
do is to raise the price for the H types to yH + " and scrap the red tape and social welfare
would unambiguously go up. In such cases, bribe taking would be an antidote to red tape
and they would move in opposite directions. This is the old idea that corruption greases the
wheels and increases eﬃciency (Huntington 1968), but note that it can only happen when the
government is not using its choice of rules to maximize welfare.
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sirable mechanisms that are more subject to corruption and less desirable ones
that are less so. This is exactly the choice in Scenario 4 but also in Scenario 5.
Corruption is therefore an outcome of this choice.
3.5 Firms and Governments: A Digression
The broad framework developed above would apply, mutatis mutandis, to any
situation where the principal cares about the assignment of slots to the right
people but not how much money he makes from the slots, but the slot allocation
is implemented by an agent who does not care about who gets the slots but
is concerned about how much money he makes. This first assumption comes
directly from our framework.
However, much of what is interesting here also relies on two additional assump-
tions. First, the private valuation of those who receive the slots is not necessarily
equal to the value the principal puts on giving them the slots. Second, the pri-
vate valuation may not be the same as the ability to pay.
These assumptions are quite natural in the context of thinking about govern-
ments and similar organizations, such as nonprofit organizations. However, in
the conventional way of looking at market transactions (think of the principal
as the manufacturer, the agent as the retailer and the clients as buyers), none of
these three defining assumptions probably apply. We now recognize that there
are many transactions involving firms where the firm is not seeking to maximize
short-run profits. This may be because of multitasking, reputation, or signal-
ing, for example, or because the transaction is internal to the firm (e.g., who
should be promoted). In such cases, our first two assumptions are likely to be
satisfied. However, the third key assumption (about the divergence between the
willingness to pay and the ability to pay) is less obviously applicable.
Thus, Cases I and IV probably fit the private sector best (see Section 3.3.1 and
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3.3.3). We know that there can be corruption in both these cases (Scenario 2
or Scenario 5) even if the ability to pay and the willingness to pay are the same
(yL = l; yH = h). However, as already observed, there will not be red tape in
such cases, though shirking may occur.
Other potential sources of corruption that do not arise in our model may occur
in private firms. There may be conflicts over the division of the surplus with
a profit-maximizing principal—for variety of reasons (e.g., the agents may be
credit constrained), the firm may to want to share enough of its realized revenues
with its agents to align their incentives. This may be even more of an issue for
private firms than for governments, though as discussed in Section 3.6, it is
central to some things that governments do, such as tax collection.
Many reasons not in our model account for why the government may have more
corruption than private firms. One big diﬀerence between firms and the gov-
ernment is that even when many of the transactions take place within the firm,
there is still an ultimate principal (or principals) whose business is maximizing
profits. This could place a limit on the level of rents that could possibly be
captured. Consider corruption in promotion decisions. This context oﬀers op-
portunities for corruption in both sectors. In the government context, there are
jobs that one would like to capture because they oﬀer rents in terms of bribes
from customers (e.g., the job of a policeman). Thus, both the capacity to engage
in corruption and a willingness to do so exist (there are big rents). The firm
context allows for corruption because promotions are also not allocated through
a market mechanism. However, the upside gains from capturing the job are far
more limited: the customers are paying market prices, and hence, there are no
rents to be had from them. At best, one gets the rents from a higher paying
job and, in most cases, these are nowhere near the rents to be had from having
access to customers who are willing to pay a bribe.
36
A related point is that governments and firms are held accountable through
diﬀerent mechanisms. Governments have to convince voters to reelect them
but the welfare of the voters depends on a combination of many outcomes. As
a result, the electorate cannot simply use single metrics, such as revenues or
taxes collected, to evaluate performance. Firms, however, are (much more eas-
ily) evaluated along a single dimension—profitability. This diﬀerence generates
opportunity for corruption in government that does not exist in firms. For ex-
ample, consider procurement procedures. In firms, a clear mapping connects
corruption in procurement to lower profitability, which the boss typically does
not like. Whereas in the government, the resultant rise in costs is probably sub-
merged somewhere in the general budget, and while the loss of quality might
be noticed by some voters, they would most likely place small weight on it in
their decision of who to vote for. Indeed, we might speculate that those who are
in favor of corruption in government have a stake in arguing against any single
metric of performance.
In summary, firms have less slack at the edges than governments. This lack of
slack limits the room for corruption within the organization. Of course, it does
not completely eliminate corruption. Nor does it mean that all firms face little
slack. For instance, poorly governed firms or those with monopoly power or
other such factors generate slack. We are merely speculating that qualitatively,
governments experience much more slack when it faces customers and this slack
translates into more room for corruption in the organization.
3.6 Limitations of the Framework
3.6.1 Monitoring
A clear limitation of our framework is made clear from the discussion in Section
3.5 about the diﬀerences between external incentives faced by governments and
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private firms. It tells us very little about monitoring structures, other than the
obvious point that better monitoring would reduce corruption. The emphasis
on monitoring in theorizing corruption goes back, of course, to the classic paper
by Becker and Stigler (1974). Although the insights from this paper remain
fundamental, we see this more as a paper on agency problems generally and not
particularly about corruption.
There is also now a literature that emphasizes the institutional aspects of mon-
itoring. Clearly a choice exists for who monitors (the superior bureaucrats,
the community, the voters?) and how intensively (should there be pro-active
public disclosures of public accounts, of the performance of individual bureau-
crats, etc.?). Even though the Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) model captures
the important and basic idea that communities may have an informational ad-
vantage in monitoring (and therefore in controlling) corruption, the theoretical
literature on this subject has not advanced very much beyond this point, though
there is a lot of interesting empirical material available.
An important theoretical literature emphasizes the endogeneity of the eﬀective-
ness of monitoring. Lui (1986) makes the point that corruption may be harder
to detect when everyone else is corrupt. Tirole (1996) shows that in a model
where experimentation is costly, when enough bureaucrats are corrupt, every-
one acts as if they were all corrupt, which removes the incentive to be honest.
There is also the idea that people feel less bad about being corrupt when ev-
eryone else is corrupt. To our knowledge, little rigorous empirical research has
been completed based on these ideas, though they are obviously important.
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3.6.2 Reintroducing Distributional Concerns: Understanding Ex-
tortion
Another limitation of our framework is that it assumes that the government
maximizes total social welfare. However, ignoring the distribution of welfare
between the beneficiaries and the bureaucrats is clearly wrong in many instances.
One obvious example is tax collection. Tax collection is all about who pays.
In such cases, the government might prefer an ineﬃcient outcome because it
achieves the distributional outcome better and may therefore create a more
complex set of trade-oﬀs than are otherwise permitted.
Similarly, the fact that the outside option in our model allows people to with-
draw from obtaining a slot is also potentially problematic, especially because
this outside option does not vary by type. Consider a tax collection example.
Suppose you are trying to get a tax-exempt certificate because you have no
money. An undeserving taxpayer (a type L), who actually can aﬀord to pay the
taxes, does have the option to walk away: if she does not have the certificate
she can always pay the taxes and be done with it. In contrast, the deserving tax
payer (type H) cannot pay the taxes. As a result, if he withdraws from trying
to obtain the certificate, he risks prison. His outside option is worse than that
of the L type.
More generally, our assumption about outside options limits the possibility of
extortion. However, it has long been recognized that one reason many govern-
ment functions cannot be privatized is because of the potential for extortion.
We need a framework that helps explore these issues.
3.6.3 Screening on Multiple Dimensions
In our framework, the assumption that there is only one dimension of asym-
metric information is very restrictive. The bureaucrat may want to know about
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both the beneficiary’s type (because misallocation is punished) and his ability to
pay (because the bureaucrat wants to make the most money), and the two traits
may not be perfectly correlated. A simple example of what can happen in such
situations is worked out in Banerjee (1997), but the general multidimensional
screening case is not well understood.
3.6.4 Modeling Corruption
Our framework also embodies one specific view of why there is corruption in
equilibrium. Corruption occurs because the cost of violating rules varies across
bureaucrats. However, as discussed at some length in Tirole (1986), there are
other reasons. For example, the government may recognize that in some states
of the world, the bureaucrat and his clients are in position to cut a profitable
private deal that the government would like to prevent but lacks the information
to do so.
Why not then simply recognize that this deal will happen and make it legal?
One possible answer is that there are many other states of the world where
the same deal would be available, but in these other states of the world, the
government is in a position to detect such behavior, prosecute the bureaucrat,
and thereby prevent the transactions. However, if the courts cannot distinguish
between those states of the world where such private transactions are proscribed
and other states of the world where they are not, the bureaucrat could always
claim that the transaction was allowed and get away with it. By banning all
transactions between the bureaucrat and his client, the government is creating
the possibility that the rules will be violated from time to time, but it gains in
terms of being able to prosecute the bureaucrat if he goes too far.
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4 Measuring Corruption
Measuring corruption is the primary challenge in the empirical literature. With-
out robust measures, the theories cannot be tested, the magnitudes of corruption
cannot be quantified, anticorruption policies cannot be assessed, and so forth.
However, measuring corruption is challenging, and even today, relatively few
studies are able to credibly describe the extent of the problem. As Bardhan
(1997: p. 1320) notes in his review of corruption, “our approach in this paper is
primarily analytical and speculative, given the inherent diﬃculties of collecting
(and hence nonexistence of) good empirical data on the subject of corruption.”
The measurement challenges are driven by several problems. First, the very
fact that corruption is illegal makes people reluctant to talk about it for fear of
getting into trouble and, possibly, for shame. Second, the existing literature—
because of the theory it draws on and how it defines corruption—takes a trans-
actional view of corruption. Measurement means finding out who bribed who
and by how much, which is inherently harder to quantify. Third, the traditional
narrow focus on monetary transactions also makes it more diﬃcult.19 When a
government oﬃcial benefits by stealing “time”—she decides not to show up for
work—random spot checks can be very revealing (e.g. Chaudhuri et al. 2006).
Finally, measurement systems will evoke responses that make the measurement
system less reliable. If the government has a monitoring system in place, people
adjust to it and find ways around it. As a result, these measurement systems
will underestimate corruption.
Despite these diﬃculties, many early attempts at measuring corruption relied
on rich qualitative data and were occasionally backed up by numbers. These
studies gave the first real evidence about the channels through which corrup-
19There are exceptions. For example, Tran (2008) gathers a comprehensive set of internal
bribery records from a firm in Asia to document the cost of bribe payments over time.
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tion occurred and possible methods to eliminate it. Wade (1982) in particular
provides a detailed description of how irrigation engineers reap revenue from
the distribution of water and contracts in a village in South India. The most
fascinating aspect of this study was the documentation of a fairly formal system
in which the engineers redistributed revenue to superior oﬃcers and politicians.
To obtain transfers to lucrative posts, the junior oﬃcers paid bribes based on
expectations about the amount of bribe money that can be collected from the
post. Thus, the value of the bribe payment in the transfer process was higher
for jobs that had greater potential for bribe extraction. In essence, the ability
to take bribes in a job induces bureaucrats to bribe others to get it. This highly
detailed study gives a glimpse into the pervasiveness of corruption in this area
and the mechanics of how it operates. It also illustrates how corruption is in-
terconnected throughout the entire organization and raises the possibility that
rather than trying to remove one aspect of corruption, it may be necessary to
invoke coordinated policies to stamp it out throughout the system. However,
like all case studies, the study raises questions of generalizability. Is there as
much corruption in other contexts? Under what set of circumstances do these
systems come into being?
Other early studies focused on anticorruption policies. For example, Klitgaard
(1988) provides several case studies of successful elimination of corruption, such
as in the Hong Kong Police Force, Singapore Excise Department, and the Bureau
of Internal Revenue of the Philippines. In all these cases, the levers used are
intuitive from an agency theory perspective—more intense or better monitoring,
replacing individual actors, and so forth. They also all seem to involve a person
at the top of each institution who was eager to implement these changes. On the
one hand, these cases represent a vindication of an agency theory of corruption.
On the other hand, they raise the more fundamental question: if these levers
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for eliminating corruption are within the choice sets of governments, why are
they not implemented? Although they spark hope that corruption can be fought,
these examples leave lingering questions about why conditions were ripe for these
interventions, but not for those elsewhere. Is what we observe due to particular
institutional factors in these settings or to more generalizable features of how
governments function? What particular combinations of institutions, policies, or
conditions would lead to similar steps being taken elsewhere? Should we expect
the same consequences of similar anticorruption policies in diﬀerent settings?
To address these inherent problems of case studies, the next attempts to measure
corruption tried to provide consistent measures of corruption across countries.
However, given the diﬃculty of inducing people to talk about corruption, these
measures focus on collecting perceptions of corruption rather than on the actual
bribes paid or the actual theft of resources. This perceptions based approach
has been carried out at quite a large scale, generating interesting cross-country
and cross-time datasets. The Economist Intelligence Unit created one of the
first such datasets.20 The data collection eﬀort consisted of factor assessment
reports that were filled in by their network of correspondents and analysts. The
data are then aggregated into risk factors for about 70 countries. The report
included, for example, a question where the respondents rate “the degree to
which business transactions (in that country) involve corruption or questionable
payments” on a scale of one to ten, where a high value implies good institutions
(Mauro 1995: p.684). Other cross-country measures on subjective perceptions
of corruption followed, including the Control of Corruption measures in the
World Bank Governance Indicators (a description of the measures can be found
in Kaufmann et al. 2004), and measures by Transparency International.21 Each
20These data also called the Business International Indicators.
21Papers that use perception-based measures of corruption in cross-country regressions in-
clude Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer (1995), LaPorta et al. (1999), Rauch and Evans (2000),
Treisman (2000), Fisman and Gatti (2002), Adsera et al. (2003), Fredriksson and Svensson
(2003), and Persson et al. (2003).
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of these indicators uses a diﬀerent methodology with its own advantages and
disadvantages, which we do not discuss here due to space constraints.22 The real
advantage of such data is their breadth, which allows one to run large correlation
studies. Mauro (1995) is an often-cited example of this kind of study. He uses
the Economist Intelligence Unit measures in a cross-country growth regression
equation to study the relationships between economic growth, corruption, and
red tape.
While these perception-based measures of corruption provided evidence on which
countries tend to report more or less corruption, many have pointed out their
limitations. First, as Rose-Ackerman (1999) noted, it is unclear what the cor-
ruption indices actually mean and what a particular rank implies about the
type and level of corruption in a country. For example, in the Transparency
International Corruption Perceptions Index for 2008, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Mo-
rocco, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand all have the same index value. However,
the value does not tell us what the form of corruption in these countries en-
tails, nor does it indicate whether the types of corruption observed in these
very diﬀerent countries have diﬀerent eﬃciency implications. For example, in
the theoretical framework developed above, bribe taking can actually promote
eﬃciency, if the problem is that the government is committed, for political or
ideological reasons, to set the price cap below what it should be. Moreover,
corruption often emerges as a result of government interventions designed to
deal with some other distortion (see Section 3). These countries may have very
diﬀerent problems—why would the gap between l and yL or between h and yH
be the same in Saudi Arabia and Burkina Faso, given their very diﬀerent levels
of per capita wealth? Or, corruption may be a result of the government’s at-
tempt to fight some other form of misbehavior by its bureaucrats—for example,
22Svensson (2005) provides a thorough description of the diﬀerences among the most com-
mon cross-country indicators of corruption.
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in Case I (Section 3.3.1), absent a price cap, the bureaucrat might choose the
monopoly outcome and many slots may be wasted. A price cap might move the
outcome to more visible malfeasance by the bureaucrats (red tape and bribe
taking), but less misallocation and less ineﬃciency overall. Greater corruption
in one country could simply be a reflection of a greater willingness to fight cor-
ruption in that country. Because they do not supply information about the
sources of corruption, these corruption indices actually tell us little about what
types of governance interventions would help deal with these problems, or even
whether we should reward or praise governments that have less corruption by
these measures.
Second, perceptions may indicate little about the actual reality of situations
because they are influenced by the way we see everything else. For example,
perhaps when the economy is good, we perceive less corruption because we are
more satisfied with the government. Olken (2009), for example, compares the
perception of corruption in a roads project with actual missing expenditures. He
finds that although there is real information in perceptions, reported corruption
is not particularly responsive to actual corruption. For example, “increasing the
missing expenditures measure by 10 percent is associated with just a 0.8 percent
increase in the probability a villager believes that there is any corruption in the
project” (p.951). He also finds that the bias in perceptions is correlated with
demographic characteristics, implying that perceptions of a nonrandom sample
of the population may not adequately reflect real corruption levels. This bias is
particularly problematic, as many perception measures are not necessarily based
on random samples. For example, the measures from the Economist Intelligence
Unit are based on the perceptions of foreign analysts, who may have diﬀerent
perceptions of corruption than the average citizen of the country. Finally, and
perhaps probably most importantly for our purposes, these data are most useful
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for cross-country or cross-geography analysis. They are less useful for testing
micro theories of corruption.
Newer methods for measuring corruption have been developed to solve the small-
sample problem and move to more concrete measures of corruption. The first set
of methods focus on refining survey and data collection techniques to improve
the ability to assemble data on self-reported bribes and service delivery quality.
For example, Svensson (2003) analyzes a dataset that provides information on
bribes paid by firms in Uganda. To encourage truth telling in the survey, it was
conducted by a trusted employers’ association; it also asked carefully worded,
hypothetical questions to measure corruption.23 Hunt (2007) uses the Interna-
tional Crime Victims Surveys and Peruvian Household surveys, both of which
contain information on bribes to public oﬃcials if the individual has been the
victim of a crime.24 Other studies collect prices paid for services that should be
free. For example, Banerjee et al. (2004) collects fees paid at government health
centers in India (that should mostly be free), while Atanassova et al. (2008)
collect data on prices paid and quantities received from the public distribution
system in India and compare them to the oﬃcial prices for these commodities.
The main benefit of these methods is a move to measures that have actual mean-
ings. For example, using the measure in Banerjee et al. (2004), we can estimate
the bribe amounts paid at the health centers and use this information to under-
stand how the bribes aﬀect the allocation of health services. We can also use
it as an outcome measure to study the eﬀectiveness of anticorruption policies
in government health centers. However, these types of measures are limited if
individuals are underreporting bribes, and particularly if this underreporting is
23For example, “Many business people have told us that firms are often required to make
informal payments to public oﬃcials to deal with customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, and
services, etc. Can you estimate what a firm in your line of business and similar size and
characteristics typically pays each year?”
24Mocan (2008) also use the ICVS to determine what characteristics were associated with
greater corruption.
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biased by corruption levels. Moreover, most of the time, these measures are
often limited to petty corruption, because it is diﬃcult to ask individuals about
the larger bribes that they may have paid. Indeed, in many of these cases the
reports are assumed to be reliable precisely because the agents do not know
how much they should have paid, and therefore, do not see themselves as pay-
ing bribes. It is also clear that people might be more willing to reveal bribes
that they paid in settings where the good they receive is abundant (so that they
are not displacing anyone else by paying the bribe).
The second method is the use of physical audits of governmental processes. For
example, Chaudhury et al. (2006) conducted a multicountry study of teacher
and health worker absence, where they performed spot checks to determine
whether bureaucrats were showing up for work.25 Similarly, Bertrand et al.
(2007) followed individuals through the process of obtaining a driver’s license
in India, and recorded all extra-legal payments made and the rules that were
broken in exchange for these extra-legal payments. Barron and Olken (2007)
designed a study in which surveyors accompanied truck drivers on 304 trips
along their regular routes in two Indonesian provinces. The surveyors observed
the illegal payments the truck drivers made to the traﬃc police, military oﬃcers,
and attendants at weighing stations.
One of the key challenges to the audit studies is whether the observed outcomes
actually reflect corruption rather than some less intentional form of bureaucratic
ineﬀectiveness, because often there is no smoking gun (bribe overtly paid, job
left entirely unattended, etc.). For example, Bertrand et al. (2007) find that
there is a misallocation of licenses—people who cannot drive are able to ob-
tain them. Could this be due to an “overloaded” bureaucrat who does not have
time to screen license candidates or due to an “incompetent” bureaucrat who
25Other such studies include Duflo et al. (2008), who measure teacher absence, and Banerjee
et al. (2007), who measure absenteeism among medical providers.
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cannot distinguish between a good and bad driver? To understand this issue,
Bertrand et al. (2007) collect detailed quantitative and qualitative data on how
the bureaucrats behave during the licensing process. They document extreme
behaviors (e.g. simply never administering a driving test) which would be hard
to label as “incompetence.” Similarly, Duflo et al. (2008) measure teacher absen-
teeism in rural India using audit methods. Does the fact that teachers often do
not come to school imply that they are consciously breaking the rules for private
gain? Or are lives of these teachers so diﬃcult that they just cannot make it to
school often enough, despite trying as hard as they can? The research design
provides information that allows them answer these questions. Specifically, they
evaluate a program that monitors the teachers and provides incentives to the
teachers based on their attendance. They find that teachers are very responsive
to the incentives. That teachers respond to the incentives so strongly implies
that the teachers were previously ignoring the rules and were not incapable of
attending.
We refer to the third technique as “cross-checking”. The idea behind it is to
compare oﬃcial records of some outcome with an independently collected mea-
sure of the same outcome. One example of cross-checking is to compare how
much money was released to the bureaucrat with how much the ultimate benefi-
ciaries of the funding report have received. For example, Reinikka and Svensson
(2005) compare data from records on central government disbursements and a
public expenditure tracking survey to measure dissipation in a school capita-
tion grant in Uganda. They find that the average school received only about
20 percent of central government spending on the program. Fisman and Wei
(2004) compare Hong Kong’s reported exports to China at the product level
with China’s reported imports from Hong Kong to understand the extent of
tax evasion. Another way to conduct a cross-check would be to collect records
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from the bureaucrat documenting how the government resources were spent in
achieving a task and then compare them with an objective measure of how much
it should have cost to conduct the task. The diﬀerence between the two mea-
sures is, then, the estimate of how much was “stolen.” Olken (2007) uses this
method. He calculates corruption in the context of road projects by comparing
the actual expenditures reported with an independent measure of what it should
have cost to build a road of that particular quality. To obtain the independent
measure, he sampled each road to determine the materials and labor used, and
then used local prices to cost these items. He finds that, on average, about 24
percent of expenditures across the project villages were missing.26
As with any other method, this one has both strengths and limitations. Its
innovation lies in the fact that it creatively allows the measurement of dissipated
government resources without asking the actors involved if they have paid or
received an actual bribe, reducing the chance of underreporting or misreporting.
Thus, it often allows us to move past petty corruption and perhaps look at larger
scale corruption. However, it is diﬃcult to understand whether the dissipated
resources are actually corruption or simply mismeasurement in the indicators or
even just a sign of bureaucrat incompetence. For example, in Olken (2007), it
remains possible (though unlikely) that road quality is mismeasured or that the
bureaucrats are not good at building roads. It is possible (though again unlikely)
that the missing resources indicate that the bureaucrats are trying to reallocate
funds to better uses. For example, in Reinikka and Svensson (2005), it is possible
(although again unlikely) that the resources that should have gone to the schools
capitation program were actually spent on services that the community deemed
more important, and did not end up in the pockets of government oﬃcials.
26Other examples of cross-checking in the developing world include the Hsieh and Moretti
(2006) estimate of bribes in Iraq’s Food for Oil Program; Olken (2006) and Atanassova et al.
(2008) measure theft in food distribution programs using the same method; and Di Tella and
Schargrodsky (2003) use it to measure corruption in hospital procurements.
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Would this result have necessarily been bad?
One way to get around these concerns is to look for correlations (motivated by
theory) between the extent of dissipation and some other variable. For exam-
ple, to show that the diﬀerences in reported shipments is corruption and not
just mismeasurement in the shipments, Fisman and Wei (2004: p.471) docu-
ment that the diﬀerences are “negatively correlated with tax rates on closely
related products, suggesting that evasion takes place partly through misclassifi-
cation of imports from higher-taxed categories to lower-taxed ones, in addition
to underreporting the value of imports.27
In addition to these methods recently used in the literature, there are several
innovative methods being explored in current studies. Although some of this
work is not yet published, such methods will surely contribute to the tools
available for studying corruption. For example, Banerjee and Pande (2009)
attempt to use second-hand data on which politicians have gotten rich since
they entered politics to identify those who have profited from corruption.28 They
find that this measure correlates strongly with other, more direct (perceptual),
measures of corruption (e.g. the answer to the question "do you think the
politician used his oﬃce for private gain?"). Cai et al. (2009) use predictions of
auction theory to argue that certain types of land auctions in China are used to
promote collusion between the auctioneer and the participants, for their mutual
benefit.
27Duggan and Levitt (2002) provide an interesting example of cross-checking in sumo
wrestling. They basically show that a wrestler has a higher probability of winning than
expected when the match is key to his rank. To distinguish match throwing from eﬀort, they
use theory as a guide: the eﬀect goes away when there is greater media scrutiny, suggesting
that it is not eﬀort. Moreover, the next time the same two wrestlers meet, the opponent is
more likely to win, suggesting that throwing future matches is a form of the bribe paid for
winning a key match. Similarly, Atanassova et al. (2008) cross-check receipt of a BPL card
(which in India identifies someone to be poor and allows them access to a set of redistributive
programs) against actual income levels. They correlate the error rate with features such as
caste of the recipient, their place in certain social networks etc., and argue that the correlations
are what a simple theory of corruption would predict.
28Di Tella and Weinschelbaum (2007) provide a theoretical framework for thinking about
unexplained wealth as an indicator for corruption.
50
All these methods pick up the direct correlates of corruption, such as bribes and
absence from work, rather than its more indirect ramifications. In some cases,
such as teacher absenteeism, the direct consequence may be the most important.
However, the point of our framework is to argue that in many situations, the
bribe may just be the tip of the iceberg, with the more serious repercussions
showing up in terms of misallocation and red tape. The next section discusses
an example of empirical research that tries to capture the bureaucrat’s entire
decision process and its various ramifications.
5 Understanding the Structure of Corruption
Most of the empirical research has been based on measuring the extent of bribery
or shirking and on how incentives aﬀect these behaviors. Bertrand et al. (2007)
diﬀers from much of the empirical research by focusing on the entire resource
allocation problem faced by the bureaucrat and therefore looking beyond bribe
taking as the measure of welfare. The basic strategy of the paper is to experi-
mentally vary the underlying types a bureaucrat faces and use the bureaucrat’s
responses to infer their chosen allocative mechanism.
Specifically, Bertrand et al. (2007) compare three randomly chosen groups of
license candidates. The first group was told to obtain a license as usual, the
second group was given a large incentive to obtain the license in the minimum
legal time allowed (30 days), and a third group was oﬀered free driving lessons.
In our model the second group represents a situation where h and l have both
increased by the same amount. The third group represents a situation where
some of those who were low types will now become high types.
The driver’s license case corresponds to our Case IV (see Section 3.3.3). To
reduce the number of possible cases, assume that yH = h < l = yL (which, as
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always, is interpreted as the case where a substantial fraction of L types are
willing and able to pay more than a large fraction of H types are): Moreover,
assume N < 1 but L < 0:
We assume that the bureaucrat faces people drawn from this altered distribution
of types. However, because he does not know the environment has changed, both
he and the government use mechanisms that match the prior type distribution.
Of course, consumers can change their behavior as a result of the treatment:
subjects who are more desirous of a license can oﬀer higher bribes, for example.
In principle, this change may the bureaucrat to learn of the experiment and
adjust his overall strategy. In practice, we assume that the samples involved are
too small for the bureaucrat to change his behavior. In eﬀect, in interpreting
this experiment, we assume that it changes people’s types rather than modifying
the bureaucrat’s anticipated type distribution.
It is easy to check that in Case IV, an equal increase in h and l, without any
change in the rules, will have several diﬀerent eﬀects. L types will now want to
apply even if they are assigned to a bureaucrat who is being "honest," (i.e., a
bureaucrat whose cost of breaking the rules is too high compared to the benefit
from breaking the rules). Therefore, the fraction of those who apply to an honest
bureaucrat and end up getting a license should go down. However, just because
many more L types apply, many more will (just by chance) end up passing and
the average quality of those who obtain a license would decrease. However, the
gains from being corrupt would also be higher, which will reduce the fraction of
bureaucrats who choose to be honest.
The "corrupt" bureaucrats (i.e., the ones who will opt to break the rules),
of whom there are now more, will raise the prices. The fraction of L types
getting through, conditional on being allocated to a corrupt bureaucrat, should
not change but because there are now more corrupt bureaucrats, the average
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quality of driving among those who get a license should decline. Moreover,
because there are now more corrupt bureaucrats, the average amount of testing
should also decrease.
In contrast, converting some of the high types in the population (the second
treatment group) to low types should improve the fraction of drivers who obtain
a license when they are allocated to an honest bureaucrat, as well as the average
quality of licensed drivers. Those who are allocated to a corrupt person, should
receive more or less the same treatment, with the licenses going to the highest
bidders and perhaps some red tape experienced by those who want to pay less (H
types) to discourage those who are willing to pay more from claiming otherwise.
Empirically, individuals who were oﬀered the incentive were 42 percentage points
more likely to obtain it in 32 days or fewer. However, they paid about 50 percent
more to obtain their licenses, and they were more likely to break a rule during
the process (e.g., they were 13 percent more likely to not take a driving test).
In the end, these extra payments translated to a greater number of bad drivers
on the road: those oﬀered the incentive were 18 percent more likely to obtain
a license despite not knowing how to operate a car. These results are entirely
consistent with theoretical predictions discussed above, as long as there are
enough bureaucrats around who have a relatively low cost of breaking the rules.
In particular, although the decline in the quality of driving among those who
have a license would happen both with honest and corrupt bureaucrats, the
reduction in testing can only occur in our model if the bureaucrat is corrupt.
It is worth pointing out that one would not observe the same pattern if the
bureaucrats did know that the distribution of h and l has shifted. In this
case, if h and l go up by the same amount, both types would now want to
be tested when they encountered an honest bureaucrat. If they instead deal
with a corrupt person, both types just pay and get the license without being
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tested. The average price would not change and the fraction being tested would
increase. However, the quality of driving among those who get a license would
decline, because the L types who deal with the honest bureaucrat now want to
be tested. This clearly does not fit the facts about price and testing.29
The results of the driving-lessons treatment are also broadly consistent with
the theory. Those in this group are tested more often and are more likely to
have obtained a license based on passing the test. This last fact, in particular,
suggests that there are some honest bureaucrats. They also pay less for the
license, though much more than they should have legally. This is a prediction
of our model, but only because we assumed (for convenience) that all H types
have a lower willingness to pay than all L types. A more plausible argument is
that the H types actually have an incentive to shop around (i.e., go to multiple
bureaucrats until they find one who is honest). In fact, Bertrand et al. (2007)
did observe shopping around in the data, and it is therefore a plausible explana-
tion for why the increase in the fraction of H types reduces the average amount
paid.
Bertrand et al. (2007) also provide evidence that there is a lot of red tape
(i.e., pointless testing). They show that of those experiment participants who,
at least initially, tried to follow the rules (i.e., get tested, not pay bribes, etc.),
there is a higher success rate among those individuals found to be unqualified to
29However, our assumption that bureaucrats are randomly assigned to applicants plays a
very important role here. One alternative assumption would be that applicants can either
choose to go through the oﬃcial system knowing that an honest bureaucrat will be assigned
to them with some probability, but otherwise they end up dealing with a corrupt individual
who will always fail the applicant (because in the oﬃcial channel there are no bribes–the
corrupt bureaucrats find it at least weakly optimal to fail everyone who comes through the
system). Or the applicant can choose to go through the unoﬃcial channel, which guarantees
that they pay a bribe and obtain the license. In the original equilibrium of this game, it is
likely that all H types will try the oﬃcial channel, while the L types will choose the other
way. In this scenario, only H types ever take the test and fail.
In this case, during the experiment, H types will shift towards the corrupt route and
therefore end up paying more, testing less, and having an increased probability of receiving
a license. However, counterfactually, average licensed driver quality will increase because the
fraction of H types who fail declines.
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drive based on the independent test (74 percent compared with 62 percent). In
other words, the probability of obtaining a license is less than 1, even for those
who can drive, and it is not any higher for them than for those who cannot
drive. Thus, passing the test is uncorrelated (at best) with driving ability. The
testing serves no direct screening purpose.
Both these features—a probability of winning less than 1 and pointless testing—
are consistent with Case IV, in the scenario where slots are abundant. However,
to induce pointless testing, it is important that yH < h; otherwise the price
just as well be raised up to h: This divergence between the ability to pay and
the willingness to pay seems implausible in this context. The amount of money
involved (about $25) is not large for the poor in Delhi, which is where the
experiment was carried out.
A more plausible story might be that the applicants do not fully understand the
rules of the game and therefore think that it is easier to use the oﬃcial channel
than it actually is, while the bureaucrat is not in a position to directly explain to
them how things really work; therefore she uses the fruitless testing to signal to
the applicants that they need to readjust their expectations. This story would
be consistent with the fact that no one directly pays a bribe to the bureaucrat.
Those who want to use bribery go to an agent who facilitates the transaction.
When someone directly approaches a corrupt bureaucrat through the oﬃcial
route, the bureaucrat does not ask for a bribe and instead goes through the
motions of what she is supposed to do, while presumably trying to make sure
that the applicant subsequently goes through an agent.
These type of empirical results are an intriguing complement to the theoretical
framework we have laid out. They focus attention on the allocative outcomes
and not just on the bribes. They focus on the details of testing and not only
on the transfers made. In short, they illustrate the broader view on corruption
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that we advocate in this paper.
6 Combating corruption
There is a large and growing empirical literature that studies the eﬀect of ef-
forts to fight corruption. For example, Fisman and Miguel (2007) find that an
increase in punishments for parking violations in New York City reduced the
violations among the set of diplomats, who were most likely to violate the rules.
Using experimental techniques, Olken (2007) finds that theft in road projects
is greatly reduced by raising the probability of being caught. Banerjee et al.
(2007) and Duflo et al. (2008) find that strengthening incentives reduces ab-
senteeism. Using a natural experiment in Buenos Aires hospitals, Di Tella and
Schargrodsky (2003) find eﬀects of both more stringent monitoring and higher
wages on procurement prices.
Several more recent papers on this topic have also tried to go a step further and
understand whether a reduction in corruption due to monitoring and incen-
tives improves the final allocation of services. In the Di Tella and Schargrodsky
(2003) study, less bribe taking means better procurement prices, which is the
outcome of interest. Olken (2007) looks at the eﬀect of auditing not only on
theft but also on the quality of the roads that were built. Duflo et al. (2008)
study whether incentives can create distortions due to multitasking. In other
words, they are concerned that to complete the task as specified by the incen-
tives, the agent reduces his eﬀort along other dimensions. Specifically, they ask
whether providing incentives for teachers to attend school will cause the teach-
ers to compensate by teaching less. To answer this question, they measure not
only teacher attendance as the final outcome but also the learning levels of the
children. They find that the multitasking problem is certainly not large enough
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to outweigh the benefits of better incentives.
6.1 Institutional Structures for Monitoring
Corruption exists because there are not enough monitoring and incentives to
eliminate it. What then determines the extent of monitoring and incentives?
One challenge of looking at this issue empirically is essentially methodologi-
cal. What should we assume about the extent to which these rules are the
product of optimization by the government? Governments may make rules to
combat malfeasance by government oﬃcials, but how well does it understand
the consequences of these rules for corruption?
There are two possible approaches to answering these questions. One is what
might be called the political economy approach. This approach is taken in the
theory section here (Section 3). We assume some preferences for the government
and figure out how the rules and the nature and extent of corruption should vary
as a function of the underlying economic environment if the government were
optimizing based on those preferences. We could then look for evidence for the
comparative static implications of that model and jointly test the model and
our assumption about what is being optimized.
The alternative is to assume that the forces of political economy, although im-
portant, leave a significant amount undetermined, and as a result, changes in
rules can often arise as pure organizational innovations, without changes in the
fundamentals. This approach leads naturally to an experimental approach to
studying the eﬀects of the rules.
Banerjee et al. (2001) implement a version of the first approach in the context
of the governance of localized sugar cooperatives. They assume that the coop-
erative maximizes a weighted average of the profits of the various principals of
these cooperatives —the diﬀerent types of member farmers who grow the cane
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that the cooperative turns into sugar —taking into account the desire of the
management of the cooperative to siphon oﬀ as much of the profits as possible.
Banerjee et al. (2001) then generate a set of comparative statics predictions
that map the pricing of cane and the productivity of the cooperative onto the
underlying mix of farmers in the cooperative. These implications are then tested
and seem to be broadly confirmed.
However, corruption in these cooperatives is essentially private sector corrup-
tion, embodied primarily by the underpricing of cane. We have yet to come
across a paper that combines this political economy approach with the more
complex manifestations of corruption that were identified above.
More importantly, in many instances, theories of political economy are simply
too incomplete to be useful guides to what rules are actually chosen. The objec-
tive of a specific government at a specific point in time is some complex product
of its long-term goals and its short-term compulsions. Moreover, the way it
chooses rules must take into account the compulsions of all future governments.
Although there is an interesting and growing literature on this subject, it is not
clear that it is ready to be taken to the data.
It is also not clear how much governments understand about the consequences
of the various policy choices they make or about the policy options available
to them. A more evolutionary approach to policy change, where changes hap-
pen because political actors are trying to solve some "local" problem but the
solutions often have unanticipated and often global consequences, may be more
descriptively accurate. Certainly this approach fits better with the kinds of
stories that one hears about how change came to China.
An advantage of this second approach is that it permits us to think of policy
changes as organizational innovations, that are therefore at least initially ex-
ogenous in a way that technological innovations are usually thought of as being
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exogenous. That is, the assumption is that the need to solve problems is a
product of various forces of society, but the adoption of a particular solution at
a particular point in time, is less so.30 The approach also makes it clear that
governments might choose bad rules (rules that go against its own objectives),
because it does not understand the consequences of its choices.
Several recent empirical exercises start from this point of view. For example,
Besley et al. (2005) find that, in South India, there exists a relationship between
holding village meetings (i.e., more community participation in the process)
and better allocations of Below Poverty Line cards, which provide privileged
access to subsidies and government services. Bjorkman and Svensson (2009)
study decentralization in an experimental context. Rather than imposing all
centralized rules on health centers, community meetings are held to decide the
most important rules that health centers should follow, and the mechanisms for
the community to monitor the health centers. They find huge impacts: infant
mortality rates were cut by one-third. However, Banerjee et al. (2008) evaluate
a similar decentralization program in India and find that it performs no better
than the civil service based system of monitoring teachers.
It is diﬃcult to make much of these vastly diﬀerent empirical findings, given
that we do not have a particularly good theory of how decentralization aﬀects
corruption and the distortions associated with corruption.31 How does decen-
tralization change the kinds of rules that are optimal and the way in which they
are violated? How does the exact nature of decentralization factor into all this?
As it is, the presumption behind the empirical literature is that decentraliza-
tion is a shift of control rights into the hands of those who have more local
information. The basic notion is that the community now has more information
and therefore can limit the extent of malfeasance by the bureaucrat. We do see
30Banerjee (2002) discusses many of these methodological issues in greater detail.
31Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) provide a rare exception.
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some evidence that the easy availability of information matters. In the driver’s
license experiment, Bertrand et al. (2007) report that there are two obstacles
that bribes cannot get around: one is the requirement of showing some proof
of address and the other is the requirement of waiting at least 30 days after
making the initial application for a learner’s permit. Neither of these seem as
important as being able to drive, especially in India, where the driver’s license
is not always accepted as an identification. However, violations of these rules
are easy to observe, whereas the inability to drive properly is something that
requires another test to verify. Therefore, these are the rules that are enforced.
However, the answer to the question of what rules are violated in what way
must also depend on who exercises which type of control rights and what infor-
mation reaches whom, which all turns on the exact model of decentralization
adopted. More generally, theoretical work mapping the eﬀects of alternative
organizational forms on the choice of rules and corruption outcomes must be a
high priority if this literature is to make progress.
7 Conclusion
Where should the literature go next? We have already discussed a number of
the gaps in the literature. In Section 6, we discussed the need to more tightly
model “learning the system.” Here we discuss other important gaps.
7.1 Corruption and Competition
Thinking about organizational forms naturally leads to the role of competition
in reducing corruption, as emphasized by Rose-Ackerman (1978). The way we
modeled corruption takes as given the idea that the assignment of the appli-
cants to the bureaucrats is random. This eﬀectively places the applicants and
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the bureaucrat in a bilateral monopoly setting. However, the nature of compe-
tition among bureaucrats ought to be a policy choice governed by the nature
of the underlying incentive problems. This is an area of study needs further
exploration.
In particular, competition is not always a plus. As pointed out by Shleifer and
Vishny (1994) competition among corrupt distinct and uncoordinated author-
ities, who each has the power to block the "application" might be worse than
a single monopolistic rent-seeker. Barron and Olken (2007) document this phe-
nomenon using a unique dataset that they collected in Indonesia of the bribes
paid by truck drivers at road blocks. Reduction in the number of checkpoints
along the road reduces the total amount of bribes collected from them. Credi-
ble evidence on the salutary eﬀects of competition has so far been hard to find,
though no doubt the right setting to look for them will emerge soon.
7.2 Implications of Illegality and Nontransparency
One reason that corrupt bureaucrats find it hard to coordinate with one another
is that corruption is illegal. This essential nontransparency has several impor-
tant implications that deserve further study. First, if the applicants for the slots
diﬀer in their ability to make illegal deals for either intrinsic or extrinsic reasons,
then the playing field is no longer level, which introduces important distortions.
This concern is not merely theoretical. Many countries have laws that forbid
their firms to pay bribes in foreign countries, which could potentially act as a
constraint on foreign investment in countries with high levels of corruption (see
Hines 1995).
Another fallout of this nontransparency that we already noted is the reliance
on agents who facilitate intermediate bribe taking.32 The theory on how the
32See Bertrand et al. (2007, 2008), and Rosenn (1984).
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use of agents alters the nature of corruption is yet to be developed. Barron
and Olken (2007) provide an interesting insight into this relationship. They
observe that in Indonesia, truckers can either pay a bribe at every checkpost, or
pay a single bribe to an agent at the starting city. However, the contract with
the agent tends to be very simple —the amount of the single bribe does not
depend on the load carried by the truck — probably because of the same lack of
transparency. Thus means that only the most overloaded trucks pay the fixed
bribe, and the shape of the total bribe paid as a function of the truck’s load is
concave, whereas theory suggests that the optimal penalty function ought to be
convex.
A third issue is that many drivers who try to get a license without paying
an agent probably do not know the rules of the game. This happens because
corruption is meant to be secret. In other words, understanding the process by
which the real rules of the game become (or fail to become) common knowledge
between the bureaucrat and the applicants should be an integral part of the
study of corruption.
Bertrand et al. (2007) actually gather data about what individuals who are
trying to obtain a driver’s license know about the licensing process. They find
that not much is known, and more surprisingly, many applicants believe that
the oﬃcial process is more onerous than it actually is. They also found in their
qualitative work that discovering the actual rules was surprisingly diﬃcult given
that they change periodically.
These observations lead Bertrand et al. (2007) to speculate on whether the bu-
reaucrats deliberately try to make the rules more complicated than they should
be to extract more in rents. Atanassova et al. (2008) find that individuals who
are supposed to receive subsidized allocations of food grains in India are misin-
formed about their exact entitlements, and the qualitative evidence in this case
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suggests that the shopkeeper often manufactures “rules” that increase the scope
for his corruption, such as that all grain must be bought on one of two days.
Thinking about this issue leads us to an interesting theoretical possibility. Is it
possible that the government’s attempts to change the rules, perhaps to fight
corruption, generates so much confusion among the citizens that corruption
actually increases?
7.3 Learning among Bureaucrats
The emphasis on learning brings up another important issue. Although much of
the work in the field has focused on innovations in fighting corruption, there has
been little focus on the innovations in corruption. A change in policy and/or
institutions may reduce the prevalence of corruption to start with, but over time,
the bureaucrat may learn how to adapt to the new policy or institutions. For
example, Camacho and Conover (2011) provide evidence that individuals were
better able to game the eligibility rules for social welfare programs in Colombia
as rules for eligibility became better known over time. More generally, how much
of the knowledge regarding how to conduct corruption is general knowledge,
versus knowledge about a specific institution?
7.4 Norms of Corruption
The idea that the rules may be important for establishing a simple norm that
the courts can easily interpret suggests a further line of inquiry. Perhaps the
rules that the government makes for bureaucrats have a signaling role. The bu-
reaucrat or the citizen uses them to infer the society’s preferences and therefore
to decide what they should and should not do. If the government formally allows
its bureaucrats to extort money from its citizens, the citizens might take this as
a signal that the moral standards of society are low, and therefore citizens feel
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comfortable about extorting others. This idea could explain why governments
continue to have rules on their books that are violated all the time.
However, a government that has rules on the books but does not manage to en-
force them is also signaling something about its view of rules and rule-governed
behavior that might spill over into other walks of life. For this reason and oth-
ers, corruption may have a direct social cost, which is something our model does
not take into account.
7.5 The social psychology of corruption
To fully understand how corruption (or lack of corruption) becomes the norm,
there is a need to try to understand the psychology of when and where people
feel more or less comfortable about engaging in corruption. For example, a
tendency to try to legitimize corruption is often observed. It could take the
form of “excuse making” (i.e., the bureaucrat not directly asking for a bribe but
instead discussing the costs of her time in providing a service to a citizen). Or
alternatively, the citizen may suggest making a payment in kind, rather than a
monetary bribe, to make the bureaucrat feel as if she were simply accepting a
gift from a happy citizen rather than engaging in an illegal act.
The concept of legitimization may be a powerful part of our understanding why
there is not as much corruption in the world as there could be. For instance, even
in the most corrupt countries, empirical antidotes suggest that the bureaucrats
will often ask for a bribe to break a rule that impedes a given citizen but will
not threaten to punish him for no reason. For example, traﬃc policemen often
ask for a bribe if a citizen has committed a violation. However, they will not
necessarily ask for a bribe if the person as done nothing wrong, and yet it is
not clear that the enforcement in these two cases is very diﬀerent. Locating the
study of corruption in the broader context of how people relate to one another
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and to the state may be important in getting a handle on why corruption exists
in some settings but not in others.
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